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Abstract Empirical research in the economic literature is increasingly addressing
the implications of social comparison on incentive contracts by using analytical
principal-agent models. Contrary to the existing investigations, which are primarily
based on the assumption that individuals exclusively compare monetary income,
theories of behavioral science suggest that monetary income and effort represent
different dimensions of social comparison, which are weighted individually. Using a
LEN framework, the present study focuses on this aspect of social comparisons and
discusses how these dimensions and their individual weights affect optimal contract
design and contract efficiency. I consider status-seeking agents who compare
themselves to each other and differ with regard to their intensity of social prefer-
ences and the specific relevance of dimensions. Finally, I draw conclusions for the
drafting of contracts with respect to (1) the choice of performance measures and (2)
an optimal team composition.
Keywords Social preferences  Social comparison theory  Performance
measurement  Principal-agent  Moral hazard  Team composition
JEL Classification D23  D63  D86  J31  M52
1 Introduction
In recent decades, economic research on agency theory and the investigation of
optimal contract design has gained in importance, deviating increasingly from the
traditional assumption of purely self-interested individuals. Empirical studies and
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experiments have shown that human behavior is particularly determined by social
comparison processes (Festinger 1954; Adams 1963; Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt
1999, 2003; Camerer 2003; Sobel 2005). Due to these observations, analytical
agency research has investigated the effects of social comparisons on principal-
agent relationships (Itoh 2004; Mayer and Pfeiffer 2004; Demougin et al. 2006;
Sandner 2008; Bartling 2011). The existing body of literature assumes that
individuals primarily compare their monetary incomes. However, theories of
behavioral science suggest that social comparison processes generally occur in
different dimensions, which are weighted according to individual preferences
(Adams 1963; Harris 1980; Kruglanski and Mayseless 1990, p. 203; Wagner 1999,
pp. 129–131 and 213–214; Ga¨chter et al. 2012b). The individual structure of social
comparison, namely, the dimensions’ relative importance, plays a decisive role.
Thus, the question arises of which essential effects of multidimensional social
comparison need to be considered for contract design. This study’s objective is to
analyze these effects and to draw implications for (1) the choice of performance
measures for incentive contracting and (2) optimal team composition. As a simple,
but practically relevant case of multidimensional social comparison, the analysis
assumes that a decision maker does not exclusively account for monetary income,
but also considers the corresponding personal effort. The analysis is related to the
recent series of papers that has included social preferences into principal-agent
models. A lateral comparison between multiple agents is addressed in the context of
a moral hazard problem.
Some papers have already offered elaborate insights into the contractual
relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a single risk-averse agent. In this
context, Mayer and Pfeiffer (2004) investigate the use of performance measures,
assuming that the status-seeking agent compares his monetary income with a certain
share of the principal’s payoff. A status-seeking individual suffers from being worse
off and enjoys being ahead. Based on LEN assumptions, they focus on relevant
characteristics of performance measures.
In a general principal-agent model, Englmaier and Wambach (2010) consider a
risk-averse agent who compares his compensation to the principal’s expected net
payoff. The authors restrict their analysis to inequity-averse agents who not only
suffer from receiving a lower income, but also from receiving a higher income.
They point out that optimal contract design approximates a linear sharing rule as the
intensity of social preferences increases. The model is extended to a situation with
two identical agents who compare themselves to each other as well as to the
principal. The analysis shows that a team contract is optimal, i.e., each agent is
rewarded for a high team output.
Itoh (2004) examines the influence of social preferences in one- and two-agent
settings using a discrete principal-agent model. He considers status-seeking as well
as inequity-averse agents. The analysis is restricted to risk-neutral and—with
respect to their social preferences—identical agents with limited liability and
addresses how far the results would change if agents compare their compensation
net of effort costs instead of their compensation. As this extension might be
interpreted as a multidimensional social comparison, the analysis shows some
similarity to the present investigation. However, due to the assumptions of identical
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reservations utilities, identical social preferences and risk neutrality, none of the
effects occur, which are discussed in this study. Itoh’s focus is the comparison of
typical contract designs rather than the effects of social comparison on contract
efficiency.
Bartling and von Siemens (2010) extend this setting to the case of risk-averse and
status-seeking agents that have either limited or unlimited liability. They identify an
incentive and a cost effect of social preferences, which are opposed to the
principal’s payoff. While Bartling and von Siemens restrict their analysis to agents
who are identical except for the intensity of their social preferences, Dierkes and
Harreiter (2010) consider agents who differ in productivity and risk aversion under
LEN assumptions. In this model, agents compare their compensation with a share of
the other agent’s compensation and, alternatively, with a share of the total payoff.
Assuming status-seeking preferences, a team contract is optimal, although with
purely self-interested individuals, optimal contracts are independent.
Sandner (2008) extends this model by additionally assuming technological and
stochastic interdependencies. His analysis covers status-seeking and altruistic agents.
Under LEN assumptions, he observes that a diverse team structure is beneficial to the
principal, i.e., one agent is altruistic while the other one is status-seeking. The intuition
behind this result corresponds to the structural effect of social preferences, which is
identified in this study: If agents differ in the structure of their preferences, a
reallocation of efforts might increase contract efficiency. As Sandner assumes that
agents have identical reservation utilities and exclusively compare compensation, the
remaining effects discussed in this study do not occur in his analysis.
While the abovementioned papers do not address the effects of different dimensions
of social comparison, Bartling (2011) assumes that risk-averse agents compare their
effort costs to a certain degree. Therefore, his analysis shows the greatest similarity to
this investigation. Bartling assumes that agents ex ante compare their expected
compensations. Thus, the social comparison does not influence their risk premia.
Although this assumption enables the analysis of status-seeking as well as inequity-
averse agents in a LEN setting, the present analysis proves that the risk associated with
social comparison might be decisive for optimal contract design. Furthermore,
Bartling assumes that agents show the same structure of social comparison and
reservation utilities are normalized to zero. Thus, the central effects of social
comparison, which are observed in this study, do not occur either. Instead, Bartling’s
investigation allows for status-seeking and inequity-averse agents and discusses the
effects of team contracts and relative performance contracts on contract efficiency.
The present analysis focuses on the individual weighting of the different
dimensions of social comparison, restricting to the dimensions of compensation and
effort costs. Using LEN assumptions, three effects of social preferences on optimal
contract design are identified.1 The investigation shows that the inclusion of effort
comparison has a decisive influence on all identified effects. The reservation utility
of the agent who rather compares effort instead of compensation gains in
1 Using LEN assumptions makes it necessary to restrict the investigation to status-seeking individuals.
The extension to reciprocity and inequity aversion is not possible within this framework because a linear
social preference function is required; see Mayer and Pfeiffer (2004). Altruism is not taken into
consideration, although the model could be extended to this type of preferences; see Sandner (2008).
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importance (reservation utility effect). According to the structural effect, a
reallocation of effort is optimal, especially if agents differ in their weighting of
the dimensions. In the second-best solution, an additional risk effect occurs, i.e., the
principal is able to reduce the agents’ risk premia if they tend to compare
compensation instead of effort. These effects are useful to draw conclusions for
important aspects of performance measurement and team composition. Considering
social preferences, performance measures might be valuable, even if they are
uninformative about the effort choice, as long as they correlate with the dimensions
of comparison. Furthermore, the study confirms recent investigations, which show
that a diverse team structure might be beneficial for the firm. In the context of this
paper diversity relates to the weighting of the dimensions of comparison.
In Sect. 2, the theory of social comparison processes is presented. An overview of
key findings is given and their behavioral implications are critically examined.
Section 3 considers the social comparison between two status-seeking agents who
differ in the intensity and in the structure of their preferences. The essential effects
of a multidimensional social comparison on contract design are analyzed and
illustrated. Conclusions with respect to important questions of performance
measurement and team composition are discussed in Sect. 4.
2 Theory of social comparison processes
Behavioral science theory has considered social comparison processes since the
mid-20th century. To avoid arbitrary ad hoc modeling, the behavioral assumptions
presented in this analysis are closely aligned with previous theoretical and empirical
results.
According to findings from psychological studies, social comparison processes
are based on the human drive to evaluate individual ability and performance
(Festinger 1954, p. 117; Wagner 1999, p. 48). Referring to social relationships,
Festinger states that individuals might experience cognitive dissonance if their
comparison reveals inequity. In his terminology, inequity occurs if the perceived
inputs into a social relationship or the outcomes that are received psychologically
stand in an obverse relation to those of others (Festinger 1957). Equity theory
developed by Adams in the 1960 s formalizes this definition to outline the concept
of fair exchange in social relationships (Adams 1963, 1965). His analysis is limited
to situations in which two individuals (i = 1, 2) are in a direct exchange relationship
or in an exchange relationship with a third party.2 Let Oi
(j) and Ii
(j) represent the
outcome and input of individual i perceived by individual j (i, j = 1, 2).3 According
to equity theory, social exchange is assessed as being fair by individual i if the
proportion of his perceived outcome and input corresponds to a normative
expectation, which is obtained by reference to person j:
2 This third-party allocation situation can be demonstrated in real working environments if employees
compare themselves to each other as they actually exchange goods with their employer.
3 In his early work on distributive justice, Homans used the quasi-economic terms ‘‘profits’’ and












































In the first case, individual i is behind and thereby suffers from a feeling of relative
deprivation and dissatisfaction; in the second case, he is ahead, which might cause a
feeling of guilt.4 The outcomes and inputs of social relationships represent highly
aggregated constructs that, in general, relate to a variety of attributes. Depending on the
exchange situation and individuals involved, inputs might be education, experience,
seniority, ethnic background, or effort expended. Possible outcomes could be any kind
of reward, such as monetary compensation, commendation, or a higher social status
(Adams 1965, pp. 277–279). Not only is the valuation of these attributes a matter of
perception, but so is their selection and functional aggregation. Adams emphasizes two
characteristics of attributes that make them potential inputs: individuals have to (1)
recognize their existence and (2) consider them to be relevant in the given situation. In
accordance with the terminology used in the literature, the attributes chosen will be
referred to as dimensions of comparison (Carrell and Dittrich 1978, p. 207).
According to equity theory, people react to perceived inequity in different ways.
Aside from distorting their perceptions of inputs and outcomes, leaving the social
relationship, or changing their reference person, individuals tend to alter their own
inputs and outcomes to restore equity. If possible, they might even attempt to alter
their reference person’s inputs and outcomes (Adams 1965, pp. 283–296). The
selected alternative ultimately depends on the adequacy and costs in the given
situation (Adams 1965, p. 277; Walster et al. 1973, p. 158).
The implications of perceived inequity have been empirically confirmed
in situations when individuals are behind (Thibaut 1950; Jaques 1961; Leventhal
et al. 1969; Pritchard 1969). In this case, individuals in general feel deprived, i.e.,
they intend to restore equity. This type of preferences is typically described as envy.
However, the findings about advantageous comparisons are less clear. While some
investigations have succeeded in supporting the theoretical expectations, that people
feel guilty and try to restore equity (Jaques 1961; Adams 1963; Leventhal et al.
1969), other experiments have concluded that beneficiaries do not show a feeling of
guilt (Lawler 1968; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Walster et al. 1978; Mowday 1987).5
Some experiments have even suggested that individuals experience a feeling of
4 Equity theory presumes that individuals are naturally selfish and that social preferences can be
attributed to socialization in groups, which generally reward equitable and punish inequitable behavior.
According to this argumentation, differences in socialization might be one explanation for the ambiguous
empirical results reported on individual reactions to advantageous comparisons.
5 Even if individuals feel guilty about an advantageous comparison, the threshold for this distress should
be higher than it is for deprived individuals on average; see Homans (1961), Adams (1965), and Lawler
(1968).
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satisfaction and self-affirmation in being ahead and, therefore, try to extend their
leads (Frank 1985; Falk et al. 2003, 2005; Fehr et al. 2008). This is usually
simplistic described as spite.
The combination of being envious in case of a disadvantageous comparison and
feeling guilty in case of an advantageous comparison is known as inequity aversion,
i.e., individuals try to accomplish equity, independent of their own relative status.
The present analysis is limited to status-seeking individuals that are characterized by
a combination of envy and spite.6
Based on the main assertions of equity theory, several experimental investiga-
tions have addressed the proportionality measure of perceived inequity proposed by
Adams and have discussed alternative ways of defining equity (Walster et al. 1973;
Romer 1977; Samuel 1978; Harris 1980).7 It turns out that a linear formula fits
empirical results better than Adams’ proportionality approach. Therefore, Harris




i  ai  IðiÞi ¼ OðiÞj  ai  IðiÞj
The preference parameter ai C 0 of individual i might depend on (the perception
of) the specific context and reference person. It represents the relevance of input
attributes in the social comparison of individual i. For ai = 0, an equal distribution
of outcomes is perceived to be fair, independent of the individuals’ inputs. The
higher the value of ai, the more the given inputs determine a fair allocation of
outcomes. Because this linear representation of the equity formula has been
empirically confirmed and is analytically tractable, it is used to model social
preferences in the present analysis.
Although equity theory and related theories of social exchange have been the
predominant approaches to analyzing social comparison for a long time, they have
been criticized in several areas. For example, the theoretical expositions assume that
individuals compare primarily with those who have similar performance-related
attributes, which is an imprecise definition. The choice of reference persons and
dimensions as well as their valuation are also insufficiently specified by equity
theory (Farkas and Anderson 1979; Deutsch 1985). Furthermore, limiting the
analysis to interindividual comparison has been criticized for failing to consider a
connection to higher level justice and social norms (Martin and Murray 1983).8
Nevertheless, equity theory is still one of the most important theoretical approaches
to analyzing social comparison. Thus, it provides a suitable basis for further
investigations.
6 Furthermore, altruistic preferences describe the case in which individuals generally enjoy if others
receive a higher outcome or have to provide lower input, even if they are behind. For an overview of
types of social preferences with further references, see Sandner (2008), pp. 7–11.
7 Typically, quantitatively measured inputs of a number of people involved in a social relationship are
presented to the study participants and different allocations of outcomes are suggested. In each case, the
subjects have to judge whether the allocation is perceived to be fair. Afterwards, it is analyzed to what
degree alternative equity formulas can explain the assessments of fairness. An overview of equity
formulas that are discussed in literature is provided by Harris (1980).
8 For further criticism, see Dornstein (1991), pp. 30–32.
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3 Social comparison in a two-agent model
3.1 The general model
In this section, I investigate a situation in which a risk-neutral principal hires two
risk-averse agents, each controlling an activity. According to the related attributes
hypothesis, social comparison takes place among individuals that are similar with
respect to performance-related attributes (Wheeler et al. 1982; Festinger 1954,
pp. 120–121). It is assumed that the agents work in close proximity and that their
activities are similar enough to meet this requirement, while the principal’s task and
status are too different to allow for social comparison.9 Agent i provides effort
ai C 0. The principal’s ex ante random payoff ~xi is given by:
~xi ¼ bi  ai þ ~ei
The marginal productivity of agent i’s effort is denoted as bi [ 0, and the random
variable ~ei is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ri
2. It is assumed that
neither technological nor stochastic interdependencies exist. In particular, ~e1 and ~e2
are uncorrelated.10 Agents are effort-averse, so the provision of effort induces costs
ki = 0.5ai2 for agent i.
Under symmetric information, the principal offers contracts to both agents. After
the agents accept these offers, but before the realization of ~e1 and ~e2, they
simultaneously choose effort levels, which cannot be observed by the principal.
Because the realization of the payoff levels does not reveal the agents’ efforts, the
principal has to evaluate their performance using the available information about x1
and x2. The investigation is limited to incentive contracts, which are linear in these
performance measures (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1987; Hemmer 2004). The
compensation ci of agent i comprises a share vii in his own payoff xi and vij in the
payoff xj. Additionally, a fixed wage fi is granted:
ci ¼ vii  xi þ vij  xj þ fi for i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6¼ j
The economic literature distinguishes team contracts from relative performance
contracts. While a team contract is characterized by a positive share in the other agent’s
payoff (vij [ 0), a relative performance contract reduces an agent’s compensation if the
other agent’s payoff increases (vij \ 0). Agents decide on contract acceptance and effort
levels under symmetric information with regard to their preferences and contractual
parameters.11 Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of the principal-agent relationship.
9 These assumptions seem to cover a variety of real working situations. However, there are settings that
do not fit this stereotype and thus have to be excluded from the present analysis.
10 For optimal contract design in a model with multiple agents in which technological and stochastic
interdependencies are considered, see Sandner (2008). Although especially technological interdependencies in
the form of a team production setting might give additional reason for social comparison in corporate practice,
they are neglected in the present analysis in order to keep the model tractable. Further analysis shows that
including interdependencies would complicate the calculations without changing the main results.
11 Note that it is not assumed that agents can observe each other’s efforts. If agents work together closely,
they have beliefs about the other’s effort, which is sufficient to generate social comparison. Mutual
observability of effort generally enforces these effects (Bartling 2011, p. 190), but this is not a
prerequisite for the social comparison of effort or for solving the analytical model. The standard
assumption of knowing each other’s preferences is accepted in the analytical agency literature.
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In the framework described thus far, social comparison between the agents is
considered. The theory suggests that the comparison relates to attributes, which
measure the inputs and outcomes of each agent in the given principal-agent
relationship. A large body of work has analyzed the attributes that apply to business
relationships because they represent a classical example of social exchange
processes and can easily be reproduced in laboratory experiments (Adams 1965;
Lawler 1968; Pritchard 1969). While the relevance of monetary compensation as the
main attribute of outcome is well established, several attributes of input, such as
personal effort, tenure, job status, and responsibility, have frequently been shown to
significantly influence equity judgments (Cowherd and Levine 1992; Sell and
Griffith 1993). As indicated by various investigations, the effort exerted on the job is
of great importance to explaining job input (Deutsch 1985; Overlaet and Schokkaert
1991; Ga¨chter et al. 2012b). For this reason, the present analysis assumes that
compensation and effort costs are the relevant attributes for outcome and input. As
preferences are common knowledge, equilibrium efforts are known. Therefore, the
dimensions do not need to be interpreted. Although some bias in perception might
remain, the analysis assumes that it is small enough to be neglected.
For modeling social comparison of the agents, two preference parameters are
introduced.12 The parameter ci [[0, 1] represents the relative weight of the dimensions,
i.e., the structure of social comparison. A high value of ci indicates that agent i primarily
compares monetary income. For ci = 1, effort costs are neglected in social comparison,
which is predominantly assumed in the economic literature. Lower values of ci
characterize agents who especially compare effort costs. If the expression
ci  ðcj  ciÞ þ ð1  ciÞ  ðki  kjÞ ð1Þ
is positive, agent i feels deprived, otherwise he experiences advantageous inequity. The
model considers agents whose utility depends not only on their own net compensation
ci - ki, but also on the measure of inequity (1), deduced from equity theory.
Aside from the structure of fair exchange, the social comparison of agent i is
characterized by an individually distinct intensity of social comparison, which is
represented by the parameter xi [ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the disutility due to social
preferences measured in monetary units is assumed to take the following linear form:13
principal offers contracts, 
agents decide on 
acceptance 
agents simultaneously 
choose effort levels  







Fig. 1 Timeline of principal-agent relationship
12 For a derivation of the social preference function from psychological results of Sect. 2, see the appendix.
13 A linear preference function is typical for modeling status-seeking agents in LEN models; see Mayer
and Pfeiffer (2004), Sandner (2008), and Dierkes and Harreiter (2010). As a consequence of a linear
preference function, the degree to which utility from compensation and from social comparison are
substitutes is independent of the absolute income level. This contradicts the intuitive expectation that a
large decrease in compensation, which challenges the material existence of an individual, cannot be
balanced by social comparison. However, a linear preference function is required under LEN
assumptions. It might be understood as an approximation of a more complex preference function in a
given range of compensation.
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Ni ¼ xi  ci  ðcj  ciÞ þ ð1  ciÞ  ðki  kjÞ
 
As indicated before, different types of social preferences seem to influence human
behavior.14 Although most theoretical approaches, such as equity theory, emphasize
inequity aversion, experimental investigations have shown that, depending on the
reference person, on the exchange situation as well as on the individual socialization
and cultural environment, other types of social preferences such as status-seeking
preferences might occur (Frank 1985; Levine 1998; Falk et al. 2003, 2005; Fehr et al.
2008). The present analysis contributes to the investigation of optimal incentive
contracting with status-seeking agents (Itoh 2004; Mayer and Pfeiffer 2004; Sandner
2008; Dierkes and Harreiter 2010; Bartling 2011).
In case of a disadvantageous comparison, the preference function Ni becomes
positive. Negative values of Ni indicate an advantageous comparison. The
assumption xi B 1 ensures that the direct monetary effect on utility due to a
variation in the agent’s effort always exceeds the implicit effect due to social
preferences. A social disutility that can be interpreted as envy occurs if an agent
experiences higher effort costs or receives a lower compensation compared with the
other. An advantageous comparison creates satisfaction due to self-enhancement or
spite. The parameters xi and ci represent individual preferences, which are
exogenous and uncontrollable by the principal.15
By choosing optimal contract parameters, the risk-neutral principal aims to
maximize his expected net payoff:16
EUP ¼ E½~x1 þ ~x2  ð~c1 þ ~c2Þ
It is assumed that the agents’ preferences are given by negative exponential
utility functions, which implies constant measures of absolute risk aversion ri [ 0.
The utility of agent i, depending on compensation ci, effort costs ki, and disutility of
comparison Ni, is given by:
uiðci  ki  NiÞ ¼ eriðcikiNiÞ
Due to the linear specification of the compensation contract and the social
preference function, the agent’s objective ci - ki - Ni is normally distributed.
Thus, his certainty equivalent is given by (Spremann 1987):
CEi ¼ E½~ci  ~Ni  ki  0:5  ri  V ½~ci  ~Ni
To optimize his objective function, the principal has to consider participation as
well as incentive constraints. By granting a sufficiently high compensation, the
principal ensures that the agents’ expected utility is at least as high as their
reservation utility, which can be understood as the utility of alternative employment.
14 There is empirical evidence of the various types of social preferences; see Rabin (1993), Clark and
Oswald (1996), Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003), Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Camerer (2003).
15 The choice of agents is not part of the analytical model. Nevertheless, conclusions can be drawn with
respect to the principal’s hiring decision, which are separated from the analytical model and discussed
subsequently.
16 In the following investigation, E[] denotes the mean and V[] denotes the variance of random
variables.
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It is assumed that the reservation utility of agent i corresponds to the monetary value
Ui.
17 Agents have the incentive to accept the contract offer if the following
participation constraints are met:
CEi ¼ E½~ci  ~Ni  ki  0:5  ri  V ½~ci  ~Ni Ui for i ¼ 1; 2
The principal cannot contractually specify the agents’ effort levels, which might
result in opportunistic behavior. By choosing effort, each agent maximizes his
certainty equivalent (incentive constraint):




CEi ¼ E½~ci  ~Ni  ki  0:5  ri  V½~ci  ~Ni
 
for i ¼ 1; 2
3.2 Derivation and interpretation of optimal contract design
3.2.1 Analysis of the first-best solution
As a benchmark solution, the first-best setting is analyzed in which no incentive
problem occurs. The principal can contractually specify effort levels by imposing
sufficiently large penalties. All decisions are made by the principal under the
relevant participation constraints. The incentive rates serve the purpose of enabling
efficient risk sharing.18
Lemma 1 In the first-best setting, an optimal contract always satisfies the
condition CEi = Ui, i.e., the participation constraints are binding.
To design an optimal incentive contract, the principal has to consider only those
contractual parameters that make the participation constraints binding. Using this
lemma, the unique optimal contract is characterized by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In the first-best setting, agents are offered a fixed wage contract
(vij
FB = 0 for i, j = 1, 2). The optimal effort levels and the expected utility of the
principal are given by:
aFBi ¼
1 þ x1  c1 þ x2  c2
ki
 bi
with ki ¼ 1 þ xi  ð1  ciÞ  xj  ð1  3  cjÞ þ 2  xi  xj  ðcj  ciÞ
EUP;FB ¼
X
i; j2f1;2g; i 6¼j
1 þ x1  c1 þ x2  c2
2  ki  b
2
i 
1 þ 2  xj  cj
1 þ x1  c1 þ x2  c2
 Ui
 
The parameter ki represents the marginal cost of effort due to social
comparison.19 The agents’ first-best compensation is not performance-related.
17 Although agents perform similar tasks and work together closely, they might differ in productivity bi
and reservation utilities Ui due to individual qualification, educational background and seniority.
18 The proof of the following propositions is straightforward algebra. For Lemma 1, additional
argumentation is presented in the appendix.
19 To ensure a reasonable incentive problem, preference parameters are restricted to the conditions
ki [ 0. Otherwise, the solution to the first-best problem would be unbounded.
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Fixed wage contracts ensure that each agent’s own compensation as well as the
difference to the other agent’s compensation are deterministic. This implies efficient
risk sharing. A risk premium can be avoided.
The first effect of social preferences that can be identified is the influence of the
agents’ reservation utilities on contract efficiency. With purely self-interested
agents, the principal’s expected net payoff is reduced by the sum of the reservation
utilities U1 ? U2. Obviously, the social comparison of compensation (c1, c2 [ 0)
implies that reservation utilities U1 and U2 are weighted according to the agents’
preference parameters.
Proposition 1 (Reservation utility effect) Assume that agent i shows the higher
absolute weighting of compensation, xici [ xjcj. Then, his reservation utility
becomes less important to the principal, whereas the other agent’s reservation
utility gains in importance. Therefore, contract efficiency increases if agent i’s
reservation utility is higher, Ui [ Uj.
The reason for this reservation utility effect is intuitive. Given the binding
participation constraints, the principal is interested in increasing the agents’ utility
due to their social comparison because this allows him to reduce overall
compensation. Therefore, the reservation utility Ui of agent i influences the
principal’s net payoff in two ways. First, as agent i needs to be compensated for his
reservation utility, it directly affects the compensation cost, which is the only effect
with purely self-interested individuals. Second, by influencing compensation
payments, the reservation utility implicitly influences the social comparison of
both agents. A higher reservation utility Ui is accompanied by a higher fixed wage fi,
which causes an additional utility for agent i and disutility for agent j because of
their social comparison of compensation. An indirect cost effect occurs, because the
principal has to readjust both agents’ compensations to make participation
constraints binding. This effect is detrimental for the principal if the resulting
disutility of agent j is higher than the positive effect with respect to agent i’s social
comparison, xici [ xjcj. Altogether, the reservation utility of the agent with the
lower absolute weighting xici gains in importance.
As this reservation utility effect influences fixed compensation payments and is
of minor importance to the incentive problem, it is neglected in the further analysis
by assuming U1 = U2. Thus, the weighting of reservation utilities has no influence
on contract efficiency. To analyze the remaining effects of social comparison, it is
useful to define the following types of agents.
Definition 1 For given preference parameters, the following classification is
introduced:
(a) Agent i is effort-focused if the condition 1–2ci ? (cj - ci)xj [ 0 holds.
Otherwise he is compensation-focused.
(b) A team structure is diverse, if agents differ in types. Obviously, this is the case
if they show a divergent structure of preferences (c1 = c2) and their intensity
of social comparison is sufficiently high:
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x1 [ ð2  c2  1Þ=ðc1  c2Þ and x2 [ ð2  c1  1Þ=ðc2  c1Þ
In particular, these conditions hold if c1 \ 0.5 \ c2 or c2 \ 0.5 \ c1.
Effort-focused agents are characterized by low values of ci compared with cj, i.e.,
they particularly compare effort instead of compensation. Compensation-focused
agents have relatively high values of ci, i.e., their social comparison particularly
relates to compensation. Note that the classification of an agent not only depends on
his own preference parameters, but also on those of the other agent. Therefore, the
classification of one agent is relative to the other: High values of ci indicate that
agent i is compensation-focused if cj is sufficiently low.
If agents differ sufficiently in the structure of comparison, i.e., for high
absolute values of c1 - c2, or if their intensity parameters are high enough, a
diverse team structure is given. The following analysis will show that this
constellation is of particular interest, as it allows for a clear prediction of contract
efficiency.
In the first-best setting, a structural effect with regard to the social preferences of
agent i can be observed. Proposition 2 considers changes in the preferences of a
single agent to facilitate the interpretation, before the simultaneous influence of both
agents’ comparison is analyzed.
Proposition 2 (Structural effect) The effect of the comparison depends on the
agent’s type.
(a) For an effort-focused agent i the principal reacts to the agent’s social

















(b) For compensation-focused agents, the effects are reversed:
oaFBi













First, assume that agent i is effort-focused. If the intensity of the social
preferences of agent i increases, his optimal effort level is reduced, while the
principal requests a higher effort level of agent j. This effect of social preferences of
agent i is beneficial if the agent is less productive, i.e., the value of b2i
.
b2j is low,
and if it is more costly to induce his effort instead of the other agent’s effort, i.e.,
k2i
.
k2j is high. This condition is intuitive: With purely self-interested individuals,
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the principal assigns the higher effort level to the agent with the higher marginal
productivity and the lower marginal effort costs. If this agent particularly
compares his effort costs, the optimal effort allocation causes social disutility.
This is unfavorable to the principal because the additional social disutility requires
a higher compensation payment due to binding participation constraints.
Therefore, the desirable high effort level is reduced to mitigate social disutility.
Conversely, the principal tends to assign the lower effort level to the less
productive agent. If this agent particularly compares effort costs, he receives an
additional utility due to his preferences. This reduces the total compensation the
principal has to pay.
The reversed effects arise if agent i is compensation-focused. In this case, the
principal tries to avoid social disutility by increasing agent i’s effort level and
reducing that of the other agent. Therefore, the principal benefits from agent i’s
social preferences if his effort is sufficiently profitable, i.e., for high values of
b2i
.





In general, with higher intensity xi the principal increases the effort of the agent
who particularly compares compensation and reduces the effort of the other agent.
This turns out to be beneficial if the agent whose effort is increased is sufficiently
productive. Proposition 2 characterizes the requirements for a beneficial effect of
social comparison of one agent. The following observations regarding the combined
effect of both agents’ preferences are possible:
Corollary 1 With regard to the comparison of both agents, the following effects
arise:
(a) A diverse team structure is a necessary condition for an equally directed
beneficial effect due to both agents’ social comparison, i.e., one agent needs to
be effort-focused and the other one compensation-focused.
(b) Assume a diverse team structure with agent i being effort-focused and agent j









(c) Consider a diverse team structure with effort-focused agent i and compen-
sation-focused agent j who both show some minimum intensity level.20 For
higher structural difference cj - ci among agents and increasing intensity x1
and x1 of any agent, ki

kj increases and the sufficient condition (b) for a
beneficial effect is more likely to be met.
To understand the joint effect of both agents’ social preferences on the
principal’s expected utility, a closer look at (2) and (3) is useful. The symmetry of
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2  ðc2  c1Þ
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;
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the conditions shows that an equally directed effect as a result of both agents’ social
preferences is only possible if a diverse team structure is given. Otherwise, a
beneficial effect due to one agent’s comparison is always accompanied by a
detrimental effect because of the other agent’s comparison.
According to (b), conditions (2) and (3) for beneficial effects of both agents’
preferences are identical if a diverse team structure is given. It turns out that with
increasing divergence of structure, a beneficial effect of social preferences is more




If the agents considerably differ in their weighting of the dimensions, the
principal reduces the effort level of the effort-focused agent and increases the effort
level of the compensation-focused agent. Thus, he can generate additional utility,
which enables him to reduce the total compensation.21 This is not possible for
similar structure of social preferences because reducing social disutility for one
agent implies a higher disutility for the other.
If, for a given structure of comparison, the parameter values x1 and x2 are
sufficiently high, an increasing intensity of comparison is generally beneficial to the
principal. The intuition behind this observation is that the productivity of efforts and
the corresponding payoffs become less important for the principal. Instead, he
succeeds in generating additional utility due to social comparison and minimizing
total compensation payment.
Figure 2 illustrate the structural effect of social preferences.22 In the first
example agent 1 particularly compares compensation, while the comparison of
agent 2 is exclusively based on effort costs, c1 = 0.9, c2 = 0. Because agent 1 is
less productive (b1 = 8, b2 = 14), social preferences produce a detrimental effect as
long as the intensity parameters are small. Given a sufficiently high intensity of both
agents’ preferences, social comparison affects the principal’s expected utility
EUP,FB in a positive manner. By reallocating effort, the principal induced an
advantageous comparison and generates additional utility for both agents that
allows him to reduce compensation. In the second example, both agents
exclusively compare compensation (c1 = c2 = 1) and agent 1 is more productive
(b1 = 14, b2 = 10). Therefore, the principal’s expected utility EU
P,FB increases in
x1 and decreases in x2. In contrast to the case of a divergent structure of
comparison, the principal does not benefit from a high intensity of both agents’
comparison because the effects due to each agent’s social comparison neutralize
each other. If both agents are exactly equal with respect to the intensity of social
preferences, the results correspond to the solution of the model with self-interested
individuals.
21 A similar result is obtained if, in addition to status-seeking preferences, altruistic behavior is
considered. Assuming that agents compare compensation, Sandner (2008) shows that social comparison is
beneficial if different types of preferences are given, i.e., if one agent is status-seeking and the other one is
altruistic.




3.2.2 Analysis of the second-best solution
In the second-best setting, an additional incentive problem occurs, i.e., the principal
has to employ performance-related compensation to provide adequate incentives.
For simplicity, assume that both agents show the same structure of comparison,
c ¼ c1 ¼ c2.23 According to the incentive constraints, the agents choose the
following effort levels:
ai ¼ ð1 þ xi  cÞ  vii  xi  c  vji
1 þ xi  ð1  cÞ  bi with i; j 2 1; 2f g; i 6¼ j
As in the first-best setting, it turns out that for optimal contract design the
participation constraints are necessarily binding. Lemma 3 summarizes the
analytical results.
Lemma 3 The solution in the second-best setting is given by the following
incentive rates:
vSBii ¼
ð1 þ xi  ð1  cÞÞ  ð1 þ xj  cÞ  b2i
ki  b2i þ ð1 þ xi  ð1  cÞÞ2  ð1 þ 2  xj  cÞ  ri  r2i
; vSBij ¼
xi  c
1 þ xi  c  v
SB
jj
The resulting effort levels and the principal’s expected net payoff are given by:




1 þ ðx1 þ x2Þ  c
2  ki  b
2
i  mi 
1 þ 2  xj  c
1 þ ðx1 þ x2Þ  c  Ui
 






 ri  r2i
Fig. 2 Influence of social comparison in the first-best setting
23 This assumption enables a clearer presentation without changing the results.
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As expected, performance-related compensation is used to provide incentives in
the second-best setting. Similar to the case of purely self-interested agents, the
optimal incentive rates are determined by the trade-off between risk and incentive.
Obviously, the principal benefits from granting each agent a positive share in his
own payoff as well as in the payoff of the other agent. A team contract turns out to
be optimal, except for c = 0. If agent i exclusively compares effort costs, his
compensation is independent of the other agent’s payoff, vij = 0.
For c = 0, the optimal contract design violates against the controllability
principle because agent i is granted a share in the payoff ~xj, although he cannot
control it (e.g., Solomons 1965, p. 83). This is hardly surprising as recent studies
have shown that signals might be valuable for incentive contracting, even if they are
not controllable (e.g., Arya et al. 2007; Dierkes and Harreiter 2010). In the
corresponding model with purely self-interested individuals, a performance measure
should be used if it is informative about an agent’s effort.24 However, according to
Lemma 3, even uninformative performance measures might be useful for incentive
contracting if social preferences are considered.25
The reason for this result is that with social preferences agents care about signals
they are not compensated for. In contrast to the first-best setting, the principal has to
grant a share in each agent’s own payoff to induce effort. Thus, the compensation
payments ci are risky as well as the disutility due to social comparison Ni. The
variance of agent i’s objective is given by:
V ~ci  ~Ni
  ¼ 1 þ xi  cð Þ  vii  xi  c  vji
 2r2i
þ 1 þ xi  cð Þ  vij  xi  c  vjj
 2r2j
The slope of one agent’s objective function is negative in the other agent’s
compensation because of his status-seeking preferences. Therefore, a risk reduction
can be obtained through a positive share in each other’s payoffs, vij, vji [ 0.
Obviously, even uninformative performance measures are valuable if they are
correlated with outcome variables of social comparison. If social comparison is
exclusively based on deterministic effort costs (c = 0), no advantage can be
obtained by risk diversification, vij = 0.
Aside from the reservation utility effect, which carries over to the second-best case,
the influence of social comparison on the second-best effort can be separated into two
interactive effects, ai
SB = ai
FB  mi: the structural effect with regard to aiFB, which is
identified in the first-best setting, and a risk effect mi. The value of mi corresponds to the
relative reduction of effort due to the second-best incentive problem.26 The multiplier
24 Given another signal ~x1, the signal ~x2 is informative about a1 if ~x1 is no sufficient statistic for ð~x1;~x2Þ
with respect to a1; see Holmstro¨m (1979), p. 84; Antle and Demski (1988).
25 The payoff ~xj is not controllable by agent i and not correlated with ~xi. Thus, it is not informative about
ai. With purely self-interested individuals, there would be no use of including ~xj in agent i’s
compensation.
26 The inefficiency increases with higher performance measure risk ri
2 and risk aversion ri and decreases




mi depends on the agents’ social preferences. This risk effect corresponds to an adjusted
measure of risk aversion ri.
27
While the structural effect is discussed in detail in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1,
the risk effect requires further investigation. Proposition 3 characterizes those
structural parameters that imply high values of mi and, hence, a less detrimental risk
effect.
Proposition 3 (Risk effect) In contrast to the structural effect, which might
increase the principal’s expected net payoff, the risk effect of social preferences in
terms of mi is never beneficial, i.e., the trade-off between risk and incentive is
tightened by social comparison, mi mijx1¼x2¼0. The loss of efficiency due to the
risk effect is reduced if agents increasingly compare compensation rather than
effort, omi=oc 0. It finally vanishes if c1 = c2 = 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the risk effect generally makes the principal’s incentive
problem more severe. The structure of social comparison influences his ability to
reduce the agents’ risk premia. If agents tend to compare risky compensation
payments, a diversification is possible that reduces the loss of efficiency. If agents
exclusively compare compensation, the risk effect vanishes completely. In this
extreme case, the second-best reduction of effort aFBi

aSBi corresponds to the model
with purely self-interested individuals.
The risk effect is illustrated in Fig. 3. In the first example (b1 = 8, b2 = 12,
r1
2 = r2
2 = 16, r1 = r2 = 1) both agents compare their net compensation, i.e., the
dimensions of compensation and effort costs are weighted equally, c = 0.5.28 In this
setting, the structural effect of social comparison vanishes completely and changes
in the expected net payoff unambiguously reflect the risk effect. Because agents
compare effort costs to a certain degree, social comparison implies higher risk
premia. Obviously, the incentive problem becomes more severe as agents are more
status-seeking.29 In the second example (b1 = 14, b2 = 10, r1
2 = r2
2 = 16,
r1 = r2 = 1), agents exclusively compare compensation, c = 1. A comparison
with the corresponding first-best solution in Fig. 2 (the second example) shows that
the relative reduction of efficiency due to the second-best incentive problem is
independent of the intensity parameters. The expected net payoff is reduced
uniformly. As both agents exclusively compare compensation, a diversification of
the risk associated with social comparison is possible.
The results of Sect. 3.2 show the importance of considering multiple dimensions
of social comparison. Assuming that agents exclusively compare compensation, as
has been done in the analytical literature, the risk effect identified in Proposition 3
vanishes. However, under the given assumptions, the risk effect is the only direct
27 Structural and a risk effect are not a consequence of the LEN assumptions, but might arise in any
hidden action model with social preferences, although possibly with deviating directions and relevance.
An important advantage of the LEN model is the possibility to analyze them separately.
28 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), p. 849 and Itoh (2004), p. 39 for this way of weighting the dimensions.
29 This observation is in contrast to Sandner’s result, which states that for identical agents social
preferences do not have an influence on the principal’s expected utility; see Sandner (2008), pp. 76, 150.
Because his analysis assumes that agents exclusively compare compensation, the detrimental risk effect
does not occur.
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effect of social comparison on incentive contracting because all other effects are
first-best effects and are only implicitly a matter of incentive provision, as they
change the underlying first-best allocation of efforts.
4 Conclusion
The present analysis shows that the individual weighting of the dimensions of
comparison is important to optimal contract design and contract efficiency. Under
LEN assumptions, a comparison of compensation and effort costs as simple, but
practically relevant example of multidimensional social comparison is analyzed to
draw conclusions with respect to (1) the choice of performance measures and (2) an
optimal team composition.
The effects of social preferences give insight into the optimal choice of
performance measures. With status-seeking agents, a team contract turns out to be
optimal if the social comparison of an agent is at least partly related to
compensation. This observation is in line with recent studies, which consider
social comparison in analytical agency models. Therefore, the criticism regarding
the controllability principle, which is increasingly expressed in the economic
literature, can be confirmed. It is well known that with purely self-interested
individuals performance measures should be used for contracting purposes if they
are informative about an agent’s effort, even if they are not controllable (Holmstro¨m
1979; Antle and Demski 1988). This study confirms the result that under
consideration of social preferences even those performance measures might be
useful for incentive contracting, which are not informative about an agent’s effort,
as long as they affect his social comparison (Dierkes and Harreiter 2010, p. 537).
Considering multiple dimensions of social comparison gives further insights into the
usefulness of additional performance measures. Uninformative performance mea-
sures should be used for risk reduction if they are correlated with outcome variables
of social comparison. However, the extent to which they are used critically depends
on the structure of social comparison. If firms additionally use incentive schemes,
Fig. 3 Influence of social comparison in the second-best setting
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which are not based upon the given performance measures, e.g., subjective
performance evaluations, the relevance of compensation as a variable of measuring
outcome is reduced and team compensation becomes less important. If individuals
tend to compare deterministic job input (e.g., effort, tenure, job status), the
usefulness of team compensation is mitigated as well. Considering a company as a
social network characterized by a multilayered and complex structure of social
relationships and comparison processes, the derived results emphasize the
importance of aggregated performance measures—even if the weighting of the
available metrics is associated with considerable problems in corporate practice.
From a team composition perspective the structure of social comparison affects
the extent to which the agents’ outside options affect contract efficiency. A
beneficial team structure is given if the reservation utilities of the team members
who show the higher absolute weighting of compensation exceed the reservation
utilities of the team members who tend to compare their inputs. In this case
granting each individual his reservation utility is less expensive. This observation
might be useful in matching team members with different outside options.
Furthermore, detrimental effects of social preferences can be avoided if team
members working in close proximity differ in their structures of social
comparison, i.e., the agents’ preferences complement one another.30 These results
might help in obtaining testable behavioral predictions. In particular, because
individuals tend to compare those attributes that are unequivocal, a disclosure of
compensation rules and payments should intensify a comparison of compensation
and, for given contractual parameters, increase individual effort. For the same
reason, organizing teams in which individuals work together in close relationships
and have sufficient information about each other’s efforts might enforce a
comparison of effort (Bartling 2011, p. 190; Ga¨chter et al. 2012b). If the model
predictions can be confirmed, the disclosure of compensation and effort
information might be used to influence the structure of comparison.31 Furthermore,
a variety of other contextual aspects might be considered, which influence the
intensity and structure of social comparison (MacLeod 2007, Luft and Shields
2009, p. 60).
Previous economic research, which has focused on the comparison of monetary
compensation, has identified and discussed implications of social preferences in
business relationships. The conclusions drawn from these analytical agency models
should be interpreted with caution. The present analysis, which additionally
includes a comparison of effort costs as a simple, but practically relevant example,
shows that the results and practical implications of a multidimensional social
comparison might change considerably. Psychological and experimental findings
30 A similar conclusion can be drawn if aside from status-seeking preferences altruistic agents are taken
into consideration; see Sandner (2008), p. 166. The results of this study confirm Sandner’s conclusion that
diversity in team composition might be beneficial. Ga¨chter et al. (2012b) come to a similar result by
experimentally analyzing the reciprocity of workers who compare compensation as well as effort
information.
31 Of course, the disclosure of information might cause additional effects that are not part of the previous
model, but that might be important in corporate practice. Furthermore, empirical investigations should
consider that the model predictions critically depend on the assumption of status-seeking preferences.
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largely indicate that social comparisons take place in multiple dimensions—with
effort as an important dimension in business relationships (Deutsch 1985; Harris
1993).32 However, a closer empirical analysis of equity judgments and the
weighting of attributes in working environments could help in obtaining more
specific conclusions.
Some restrictions with respect to the model results arise from the notion of social
comparison that is used. While the analysis relates to individual comparison with
the purpose of evaluating own ability and performance, the notion of fairness in
groups and societies might also relate to high-order norms of equity (Lazear 1989;
Luft and Shields 2009, p. 60; Ga¨chter et al. 2012a) that additionally have an
influence on the incentive mechanisms that firms apply. For example, the optimal
contracts derived in this analysis systematically violate the principle ‘‘equal pay for
equal work’’. The additional consideration of social norms might mitigate
differences in compensation due to individual preferences.
Finally, various assumptions, which restrict the findings of the analysis, should
be addressed. In particular, in order to make use of the conclusions, companies
must have knowledge of the intensity and structure of their employees’ social
preferences. Furthermore, the present analysis restricts to the dimensions of
compensation and effort costs. Although these dimensions are clearly important
in business relationships, many other attributes might be used, especially in a
dynamic context. A comparison to the principal is neglected, which is a realistic
assumption if he sufficiently differs in his performance-related attributes.
However, this might not fit to all business relationships.33 In addition, the
LEN assumptions make it impossible to extend the investigation to other types of
social preferences. However, although the optimal contract design is derived
under restrictive assumptions, the implications drawn from the model results
might be useful for practical application. Although economic research is
increasingly considering the results of behavioral science, many questions remain
unanswered. Based on the results of the present analysis, an investigation into
different dimensions of social comparison that additionally considers other types
of social preferences would be interesting.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
32 Some experiments even indicate that a comparison of compensation does not occur if no sufficient
information about the other’s effort is available; see Ga¨chter et al. (2012b).
33 A comparison with the principal might occur if he is member of the same team and similar in the sense




Derivation of the social preference function:
With compensation as outcome and effort costs as input of comparison, agent i
perceives the compensation payment to be fair if the following equation holds:34
O
ðiÞ
i  ai  IðiÞi ¼ OðiÞj  ai  IðiÞj , ci  ai  ki ¼ cj  ai  kj
This definition of fair exchange is invariant to identical relative changes in the
weighting of both dimensions, i.e., rescaling the weights of compensation and effort
costs with a positive constant di [ 0 defines the same preferences:
ci  ai  ki ¼ cj  ai  kj , di  ci  ðdi  aiÞ  ki ¼ di  cj  ðdi  aiÞ  kj
Therefore, an individual’s preferences are characterized by the proportion 1/ai of
these weights instead of the absolute weights di of outcome and diai of input.35 The
equity formula above specifies combinations of compensation and effort costs that
are perceived to be fair (structure of social comparison), but it includes no
information about the extent to which this equity judgment influences an
individual’s decision making (intensity of social comparison). To separate these
two concepts, the parameter ai derived from Harris (1980) should not have any
impact on the intensity of comparison. Increasing values of ai must not imply that
social comparison of effort costs becomes more important relative to other sources
of utility (e.g., income), but that it becomes more important relative to a comparison
of compensation. This can be accomplished by normalizing the weight of outcome
and input, di = 1/(1 ? ai).
In this case the weights of compensation and effort costs sum up to one. An
increasing value of ai shifts the focus of social comparison from compensation to
effort costs, without changing the sum of the marginal effects. Using this definition
of fair exchange, the normalized measure of inequity is defined as the difference
between the left- and the right-hand sides:
1
1 þ ai  ci 
ai
1 þ ai  ki
 
 1
1 þ ai  cj 
ai
1 þ ai  kj
 
¼ ci  ðci  cjÞ þ ð1  ciÞ  ðkj  kiÞ
The parameter ci ¼ 1=ð1 þ aiÞ 2 ½0; 1 represents the relative weight of the
dimensions, i.e., the structure of social comparison. Aside from the structure of fair
exchange, the social comparison of agent i is characterized by an individually
distinct intensity of social comparison, which is represented by the parameter xi [
34 Early contributions to equity theory assume that individuals tend to compare controllable aspects that
relate to performance. This would imply that agents compare their expected performance-related pay
instead of total compensation; see Bartling (2011). Nevertheless, this analysis includes uncontrollable
effects in social comparison. In real working environments, there might be insufficient information to
separate random effects from controllable measures or separating controllable and uncontrollable effects
is possible, but requires considerable time, effort and cognitive ability (Luft and Shields 2009, pp. 94–
113). This assumption is consistent with various analytical agency models; see Mayer and Pfeiffer (2004);
Englmaier and Wambach (2010).
35 For simplicity, Harris (1980) chooses to normalize di = 1. Nevertheless, any other definition would
have led to the same results with respect to the suitability of a linear equity formula.
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[0, 1]. The following social preference function quantifies the disutility due to social
comparison in monetary units:
Ni ¼ ðxiÞ  ci  ðci  cjÞ þ ð1  ciÞ  ðkj  kiÞ
 
¼ xi  ci  ðcj  ciÞ þ ð1  ciÞ  ðki  kjÞ
 
Proof of Lemma 1 It is assumed that the parameters ðv~FB; a~FB; f FB1 ; f FB2 Þ represent
an optimal incentive contract in the first-best setting. The real valued vectors v~FB 2
R
4 and a~FB 2 R2þ denote the optimal incentive rates and effort levels. The
participation constraint of agent i can be reformulated in the following way:
CEi ¼ Fiðv~; a~Þ þ gii  fi  gij  fj Ui
with gii ¼ 1 þ xi  ci, gij ¼ xi  ci [ 0 and Fiðv~; a~Þ independent of f1 and f2. Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that, given the optimal contract, the first agent’s
participation constraint is not binding:
F1ðv~FB; a~FBÞ þ g11  f FB1  g12  f FB2 [ U1
Consider the following definition of f^ FB1 :
f^ FB1 ¼ f FB1 
F1ðv~FB; a~FBÞ þ g11  f FB1  g12  f FB2  U1
g11
¼ g12  f
FB
2 þ U1  F1ðv~FB; a~FBÞ
g11
\f FB1
The contract ðv~FB; a~FB; f^ FB1 ; f FB2 Þ implies a higher expected utility than had the
original one. The participation constraint of the first agent is binding, whereas that
of the second agent is still met because CE2 decreases in the fixed wage f1. Obvi-
ously, this contradicts the optimality of ðv~FB; a~FB; f FB1 ; f FB2 Þ. Therefore, given an
optimal contract, both participation constraints are necessarily binding.
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